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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
vs. : Case No. 14478 
BERT JAMES DURRANT, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Bert James Durrant, appeals 
from a conviction of the crime of automobile homicide in the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Bert James Durrant, was found guilty 
by a jury, of the crime of automobile homicide, on January 13, 
1976, was thereafter sentenced to a term of five (5) years 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
probation and to serve thirty (30) days in the Utah County 
Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction 
of the crime of automobile homicide, or in the alternative, 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 2:01 a.m. on the morning 
of April 17, 1975, the Appellant, Bert James Durrant, and 
three other persons riding in Appellant's vehicle, were in-
volved in a collision with an unoccupied piece of construction 
equipment in the vicinity of 695 East 7Q0 North, American 
Fork, Utah. (R.47-54) One of the occupants of Appellant's 
vehicle was killed in the collision, and Appellant and two 
other occupants of the car were critically injured. (R.5Q-
41) Appellant was taken to the emergency room at the American 
Fork Hospital for treatment. (R.51-52) Shortly after 
Appellant was admitted to the hospital, one John Linebaugh, 
a medical technician, extracted and seized a specimen of 
blood from Appellant's body for the purpose of having deter-
mined the alcohol content therein. (R.85) 
At the preliminary hearing in this matter, Mr. 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Linebaugh testified that he is not a licensed physician, 
registered or practical nurse. (R. 31-32) Mr. Linebaugh 
also testified that although a doctor and one or more 
nurses were in and out of the room in which Mr. Linebaugh 
extracted the specimen of Appellant's blood (R.74-75), no 
doctor or nurse supervised his activities at the time he 
extracted the blood specimen from Appellant. (R.74-75) Mr. 
Linebaugh further testified that prior to extracting blood 
from Appellant, he advised Appellant that he was extracting 
a specimen of his blood for purposes of an alcohol content 
analysis, and that the result of the analysis could be 
used against the Appellant in court. (R.75) Mr. Linebuagh 
testified that following this explanation, the Appellant 
responded, "O.K., go ahead," (R.75), and that Appellant 
appeared to be in a great deal of pain at the time. (R.75-
76) 
On the basis of Mr. Linebaugh1s testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, Appellant objected to the admission in 
evidence of the result of the blood alcohol analysis, which 
the State attempted to introduce through the testimony of 
Dr. Albert Swensen (R.63-65), on the ground that Mr. Line-
baugh was not authorized to draw a specimen of Appellant's 
-3-
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blood for purposes of a blood alcohol analysis, pursuant to 
Section 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, as that statute 
has been construed by this Court in Gibbs v. Dorius, No. 
13626, decided March, 1975. (R.64-65) The Court overruled 
the objection and received the testimony of Dr. Swensen 
concerning the result of the blood alcohol analysis in 
evidence. (R.65) Subsequently, the Court bound the Appellant 
over to stand trial in the District Court. 
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to 
suppress the result of a blood alcohol analysis as evidence, 
on the ground that the search of his person and seizure of 
his blood were accomplished by one not authorized to extract 
blood for the purpose of having determined the alcohol content 
therein, pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. (R.29-41) The Court denied the Motion to Suppress. 
(R.42) 
At trial, Mr. Linebaugh testified substantially 
as he had at the preliminary hearing concerning the circum-
stances under which he seized a specimen of the Appellant's 
blood for a blood alcohol analysis. (R.85-87) Appellant 
renewed the Motion to Suppress the result of the blood alcohol 
analysis on the grounds previously urged (R.97); the Court 
again denied the Motion and permitted Dr. Swensen to testify 
-4-
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as to the result of the blood alcohol analysis and give an 
opinion as to the sobriety of Appellant at the time of the 
accident based upon the result of the blood alcohol analysis. 
Over the objection of Appellant, the Court 
instructed the jury that the mental state of "negligence" 
required for the commission of the offense of automobile . 
homicide consisted in the: 
Failure to use ordinary and 
reasonable care in the manage-
ment of one's property or 
person. It is the failure 
to do what an ordinary or 
reasonable person would have 
done under the circumstances 
or the doing of what such 
person would not have done. 
The fault may lie in acting 
or omitting to act. (R.22) 
Appellant objected to the above instruction because it is 
an instruction on "ordinary" or simple negligence whereas the 
penal statutes of this State, including the statutes defining 
the offense of automobile homicide,0 require that one charged 
with the offense act with the mental state of "criminal negli-
gence", in respect to the conduct constituting the offense, 
in order to be convicted thereof. (R.ll) 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE THE RESULT OF A BLOOD 
ALCOHOL ANALYSIS PERFORMED UPON 
A SPECIMEN OF APPELLANT'S BLOOD, 
WHERE THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S 
PERSON OR SEIZURE OF HIS BLOOD 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ONE NOT AUTH-
ORIZED TO EXTRACT BLOOD FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF HAVING DETERMINED THE 
ALCOHOL CONTENT THEREIN, PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 
(1953), AS AMENDED. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah contains 
a provision identical to- that found in the Federal Constitution 
barring unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, Section 
XIV of the Utah Constitution provides that: 
The right of the people to 
*• be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant 
shall issued but upon probable 
cause supported oath or affirm-
ation, particularly describing 
a place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
In Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1956), 
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the United States Supreme Court held that under the Federal 
Constitution, the taking of a blood specimen from an indivi-
dual, even without his consent, to determine the alcohol con-
tent therein, does not constitute an unreasonable search and 
seizure, provided that the procedure is performed under pro-
tected conditions by competent, medical personnel. Section 41-
6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, describes and delimits 
the persons who are deemed competent to draw blood for the 
purpose of determining its alcohol content in the State of Utah. 
That section provides: 
Only a physician, registered 
nurse, practical nurse, or 
duly authorized laboratory 
technician, acting at the 
request of a police officer, 
can withdraw blood for the 
purpose of determining the 
alcoholic or drug content 
therein.... 
In the instant case, a sample of Appellant's 
blood was extracted by Mr. John Linebaugh for the purpose of 
having determined the alcohol content therein. At the prelim-
inary hearing and the trial in this matter, Mr. Linebaugh 
testified that he is not a licensed physician, registered 
nurse, or practical nurse. (R.73-74,90) Thus, Mr. Linebaugh 
was not legally authorized to extract a sample of Appellant's 
-7-
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blood for the purpose of having its alcohol content deter-
mined, unless he was acting as a "duly authorized technician" 
within the meaning of Section 41-6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended. 
In the recent case of Gibbs v. Dorius, Utah, 
P.2d , No. 13626, decided March 14, 1975, this Court 
construed the term "duly authorized laboratory technician" 
contained in Section 41-6-44.10(f), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
in deciding that the failure of the State to provide a "duly 
authorized laboratory technician" to withdraw blood from the 
Defendant Gibbs for the purpose of determining its alcohol 
content, rendered the taking of the Defendant's blood illegal, 
such that the State could not revoke Gibb's driver's license 
for refusal to submit to the blood test. 
Reviewing the legislative intent and history of 
Section 41-6-44.10(f), the Court concluded that: 
Duly authorized laboratory 
technician must be interpreted 
as referring to the Utah 
Medical Practice Act, since 
the act of withdrawing blood 
is the practice of medicine, the 
actual introduction of a needle 
into a human body goes beyond 
the performance of a laboratory 
examination. (Section 58-12-38 
required that such performance 
be at the request or under the 
direction of a person licensed 
-8-
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under Chapter 12, Title 38), 
and falls within the preview 
of service rendered by a 
physician's assistant. Section 
58-12-40 requires that the 
activities of the assistant 
be under the supervision and 
direction of a physician and 
that the latter be liable for 
the acts and omissions of the 
former. Within the context of 
41-6-44.10(f), the term "duly 
authorized laboratory technician" 
means an individual acting under 
the direction and supervision of 
a licensed physician, such a 
person must administer the test 
... according to the standard 
medical practice. 
In Gibbs, this Court indicates that the terms 
of Section 41-6-44.10(f), are "an express concession by the 
legislature that the drawing of blood from a human being is 
the practice of medicine" and that, regardless of education or 
experience, a medical technician is not authorized to engage 
in this aspect of medical practice unless a physician, regis-
tered or practical nurse is present to supervise and direct 
the technician. Evidence presented in the Gibbs, supra, case 
demonstrated that the technician there possessed the 
following qualifications: 
-9-
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that he was a chemist with the 
City-County Health Department, 
a medical technologist with 
the United States Navy in World 
War II, that he held a bachelor 
of arts degree in bacteriology 
and chemistry, and that he was 
authorized by the Division of 
Health, and was on the approved 
list with the State Department 
of Health, and that the State 
Department monitored him as to 
his procedure in running blood-
alcohol tests 
If anything, the technician in Gibbs possessed 
more education and experience than the technician in the 
instant case, who testified as to his qualifications at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial. (R.69-70, 84-85) Never-
theless, this Court held in Gibbs, supra, that there was no 
evidence that the technician was a "duly authorized technician" 
within the meaning of Section 41-6-44.10 (f)• 
Although the Court in Gibbs partially premised 
its determination that the technician there was not a "legally 
authorized medical technician" because the State had failed to 
introduce sufficient evidence to show that the blood extraction 
procedure had been conducted "according to standard medical prac-
tice", (the Court was concerned about the possibility of unsan-
itary conditions in .the jail where the Defendant Gibb's blood 
-10- i 
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was drawn) , it is clear that even had the technician in 
Gibbs, supra, withdrawn the Defendant's blood "according to 
the standard medical procedure", that the technician was not 
authorizied to take the Defendant Gibb's blood because he did 
not do so under the direction and supervision of a physician, 
practical or registered nurse as required pursuant to Section 
41-6-44.10(f). 
In the instant case, Mr. Linebaugh testified at 
the preliminary hearing and the trial in this matter that no 
physician, registered or practical nurse supervised or directed 
him as he undertook to extract a specimen of blood from 
Appellant, although a doctor and several nurses were in and 
out of the room. (R.74-75,86) Although the technician testified 
he had a general supervisor at the hospital whom he identified 
as Dr. Call (R.74-75), Appellant submits that the decision of 
this court in Gibbs, supra, requires that a medical technician 
be immediately directed and supervised by a physician, regis-
tered or practical nurse at the moment the technician is engaged 
in extracting blood from a person for purposes of Section 41-6-
44.10(f), and that supervision in some general sense, in that 
the technician has a nominal supervisor or that doctors or 
nurses are present somewhere in the hospital, is not adequate 
to effect the legislature's intent to protect a person whose 
-11-
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blood being taken, from the risk of injury at the time a 
needle is inserted into his body by one who is not licensed 
to practice medicine. Certainly, state statutes require that 
the cited section be given this interpretation to effect its 
purpose. (See Sections 58-3-2, 76-1-2, U.C.A., (1953), as 
amended.) 
Whereas the technician in the instant case admitted 
that he was not acting under the direction or supervision of 
a physician, registered or practical nurse at the time he 
extracted a blood specimen from the Appellant's body, Appellant 
respectfully submits that the technician was not authorized 
to take his blood pursuant to Section 41-7-44.10(f), U.C.A 
(1953), and that the seizure of his blood was thus illegal 
and in violation of rights secured to Appellant pursuant to 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of 
the United States and Article I, Section XIV of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah, and that the Court below committed 
error in admitting the results of the blood-alcohol analysis 
as evidence in the prosecution of the Appellant. 
-12-
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION 
TO THE JURY CONCERNING THE MENTAL 
STATE OF NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR 
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF 
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
The Appellant, Bert James Durrant, was charged 
with commission of "automobile homicide", pursuant to Section 
76-5-207, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, 
while under the influence of intox-
icating liquor, a controlled substance 
or any drug, to a degree which renders 
the actor incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle, causes the death of 
another by operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent manner. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The offense of automobile homicide is one of 
four offenses, the others being murder in the first and 
second degrees, manslaughter, and negligent homicide, which 
are encompassed in the general offense of "criminal homicide", 
established in Section 76-5-201, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
The cited section indicates that one commits "criminal homi-
cide if he 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly 
or with criminal negligence unlawfully 
-13-
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causes the death of another* 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Although the automobile homicide statute refers 
only to the "negligent" operation of a motor vehicle which 
results in the death of another, it is axiomatic that one may 
not be legally convicted of "automobile homicide", a form 
of "criminal homicide", unless he is shown to be "criminally 
negligent" with respect to the conduct constituting the alleged 
automobile homicide, including his conduct with respect to 
the operation of a motor vehicle. That the term "negligence" 
in the statute defining the offense of "automobile homicide" 
should be interpreted as contemplating the requirement of 
"criminal", as opposed to "ordinary", negligence is supported 
not only by the language of the statutes defining "automobile 
homicide" and "criminal homicide", but also by those sections 
of the State Code of Criminal Procedure generally delineating 
the requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility. 
Pursuant to Sections 77-2-101, 102, and 104, U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, no conduct is punishable as an offense unless 
the conduct is prohibited by law and done "intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence" with 
respect to each element of the offense charged. The only 
exception to this requirement occurs where the conduct 
-14-
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prohibited constitutes an offense involving strict liability. 
Assuming then, that one may not be convicted 
of the odrfense of automobile homicide unless one acts with 
a mental state which is "criminally negligent" in respect 
to the conduct constituting the offense, decisions of this 
Court are unanimous in proclaiming that "criminal negligence" 
may not be established by the showing of a "mere thoughtless 
omission or slight deviation from the norm of prudent conduct", 
State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 806, 463 P.2d 806 (1970); and that 
there must enter into the act some measure of wantonness 
for flagrant or reckless disregard for the safety of others 
in order to constitute "criminal negligence". State v. 
Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 495 P.2d 318(1972); State v. Lingman, 
97 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 457 (1939). This conception of "criminal 
negligence" is precisely that embodied in Section 76-2-H103, 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which provides that: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Omitted 
(2) Omitted 
(3) Omitted 
(4) With criminal negligence or 
is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the 
-15-
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result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
In instructing the jury that the "negligence" 
necessary for the commission of "automobile homicide" consisted 
only in ordinary or simple negligence (R.22), the trial court 
seriously prejudiced the right of the Appellant to a fair trial 
by permitting the jury to convict the Appellant for conduct 
undertaken with a less culpable and different mental state than 
that actually required for the commission of the offense 
pursuant to State statutes defining the offense of automobile 
homicide. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated. Appellant contends 
that the Court below erred in denying Appellant's Motion To 
Suppress the result of a blood alcohol analysis as evidence 
against the Defendant and that the Court erred in instructing 
the jury, over Appellant1s objection, that the mental state of 
-16-
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negligence required for the commission of the offense of 
automobile homicide consisted in "ordinary" rather than 
"criminal" negligence. Therefore, Appellant Bert James 
Durrant respectfully submits that the conviction and judgment 
below be reversed, or in the alternative, that Appellant be 
granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kathryn Cfo/lard 
Attorney for Appellant 
-17-
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